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1 
Introduction1
 
 
The debate over job quality in the United States has intensified as labor market inequalities have 
grown.  At the core of the debate is not just the matter of describing or quantifying bad jobs, but 
of seeking explanations for change and variation in job quality, with the goal of developing 
strategies to improve bad jobs and narrow the gap between bad and good jobs.  Such 
explanations have focused on a variety of factors: workforce characteristics (Goldin and Katz 
2008, Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2005), technological change favoring higher skills (Krueger 
1993, Levy, Murnane, and Autor 2004), institutions governing the workplace (Vidal and Kusnet 
2009, Card and Krueger 1995), as well as business strategy and, in some writings, how it is 
shaped by institutional context (Andersson, Holzer, and Lane 2005, Appelbaum et al 2000, 
Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003a, Batt 2000, Bernhardt et al 2008, Cappelli and 
Crocker-Hefter 1996). 
 
Research focusing on strategy raises particularly complex issues, because it points to both the 
space for business discretion and the ways in which strategy is shaped by all the other factors.  
The distinction between product strategy (competitive strategy in the market for goods and 
services) and labor strategy (everything from job design and recruiting to compensation and 
retention) is a useful one.  Analysts have made a case for a number of regularities in labor 
strategy.  In general, researchers have argued, business success depends on some degree of 
alignment between product and labor strategies (Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003b).  
Business strategies and associated labor strategies (and therefore job characteristics) differ by 
segment within and across businesses (Batt 2000).  But even within market segment multiple, 
distinct labor strategy equilibria are possible, as in the case of FedEx and UPS or Sears and 
Nordstrom (Appelbaum, Bernhardt, and Murnane 2003a, Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter 1996).  A 
firm’s likelihood of adopting a particular labor strategy depends not just on the firm’s business 
strategy, but also on other contextual or external influences (institutional factors and constraints, 
the state of the external labor market) and internal ones (particularly managerial beliefs) 
(Grimshaw and Rubery 1998, Moss, Salzman, and Tilly 2008).  The relationship between 
business and labor strategies is most visible when market shifts precipitate a change in product 
strategy, which then requires adjustment in labor strategy (Cappelli et al 1997, Smith 2001, 
1991).  In general, the adjustment must be compatible with HR practices already in place and 
build upon these (Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter 1996).   
 
The retail industry offers promising turf for advancing this line of research.  Retail is a large 
sector (with just under 14 percent of private nonfarm employment in 2008, more than 
manufacturing).  It is a low-wage sector (retail nonsupervisory workers earn 71 percent of the 
national average) (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009a).  In terms of benefits, retail workers fare 
even worse (Mishel et al 2003, Tables 2.28, 3.13), in part because of retail’s high rate of part-
time employment (Tilly 1996).   Retailers make minimal investments in training for most 
                                                          
1 The research on which this paper is based was funded by the Russell Sage Foundation.  Additional statistical work was 
conducted for a project sponsored by the Ford Foundation.  We received significant in-kind assistance from the National Retail 
Federation in obtaining participation in the study from retailers. We also thank company officials and staff who agreed to 
interviews. The views presented here are those of the authors only and do not represent those of the Russell Sage Foundation, 
Ford Foundation, or National Retail Federation. 
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employees: according to the 1995 Survey of Employer-provided Training, workers in retail trade 
typically receive 3.7 hours of formal training as compared to an average of 10.7 hours across all 
sectors (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 1996).  Importantly, much of retail has also in recent 
years experienced a severe market shock, in the form of market invasion by national big-box 
discount chains such as Wal-Mart,2
 
 Target, and Costco (Lichtenstein 2005; Davis et al 
forthcoming).  Despite recent attention generated by the Wal-Mart phenomenon, the most recent 
in-depth examination of the job quality implications of varied retail labor strategies remains 
Thomas Bailey and Annette Bernhardt’s important 1997 article.  Bailey and Bernhardt found that 
“high road” product strategies involving high levels of service or investments in advanced 
technologies rarely involved “high road” labor strategies, a provocative challenge to other 
findings in the literature on business strategy and job quality.  For all of these reasons, in 2005-
07 we undertook a set of 16 detailed company case studies in the retail sector, looking at both 
food and consumer electronics retailers. 
We sought to answer a set of questions:  
- What different mixes of product and labor strategies are in force in US retail chains?  
Which mixes function well (in a competitive sense) in what settings?  In particular, how 
so these patterns differ between food and consumer electronics retailing? 
- How important does a “fit” or “match” between product and labor strategies turn out to 
be, and how successful are companies in achieving such a fit?   
- How do these mixes translate into job quality (better or worse in a cross-sectional sense, 
improving or deteriorating in a time series sense).   
 
We entered the study with several expectations.  First, despite Bailey and Bernhardt’s cautionary 
finding, we expected to find that competitive success depends on some degree of 
correspondence, or fit, between product and labor strategies (Wal-Mart’s success story itself is 
an example of such a fit).  To endure, such a fit would need to be sustainable beyond the short 
run.  We also expected that certain settings are more hospitable to particular business and labor 
strategies.  Within the United States, the timing of competitive change, the structure of regional 
markets, and the regional regulatory environment may all make a difference.  For example, 
Southern settings with little regulation of land use/zoning, and therefore retail market entry, as 
well as of job quality may make strategies reliant on higher service, higher compensation, and 
higher prices difficult to sustain. 
 
To briefly summarize our findings, we find that all companies in our sample espoused cost-
cutting strategies, and almost all sought as well to improve services and product quality.  Food 
retailers tended to be more “quality-driven”, attempting to distinguish themselves though the 
quality and variety of goods, whereas “service-driven” electronics retailers emphasized the 
provision of novel and useful services.  For virtually all companies, the goals of cost-cutting and 
improving service and quality are in tension, and at times in conflict.  Even in cases where 
companies are making progress toward both goals, there are questions about the sustainability of 
such progress.  The fact that cost-cutting often undermines job quality—because labor costs are 
the “number one controllable” cost in stores— is a key dimension of these tensions and conflicts.  
                                                          
2 An industry observer noted that Wal-Mart added food to its offerings to get people into its general merchandise stores for 
weekly shopping as compared to a couple of times a month, thus increasing traffic and potential sales.  This shift from the largest 
US retailer changed the economics of retail.  Target has since followed suit. 
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Many companies are struggling competitively (some have gone out of business), and in many 
cases jobs are getting worse. 
Methodology 
 
The National Retail Federation provided essential help in convincing retailers to take part in this 
study; we also contacted a number of retailers independently.  In all, we completed 18 cases, 10 
food retailers and 8 consumer electronics retailers, between mid-2005 and early 2007, before the 
effects of the current economic crisis began to be felt.  This represents site visit interviews in 16 
companies, not 18, because two companies are double cases (both food and consumer 
electronics).  It is worth noting that, since the conclusion of field work, two companies have filed 
for bankruptcy protection and two have been liquidated. 
 
In terms of format, all the exclusively food retailers but one have a regular supermarket format; 
the exception is a “mini-warehouse” format.  One of the companies that carries both food and 
electronics has a warehouse format, the other has a small store format.  Among the consumer 
electronics companies per se, four have a regular big box format, two have a small store format.  
Two of the electronics chains sell a broad range of office supplies including electronic 
equipment; we expanded the sample to include these companies both because there is a small 
(and diminishing) number of large retail electronics chains and because office supply companies 
are in fact important sellers of electronics. 
 
Among exclusively food retailers, six are independent regional chains, and two are what we call 
“cogs,” formerly independent regional chains now absorbed into national or multinational 
holding companies.  Among the exclusively electronics retailers, all six are multiregional 
companies.  The two cases that straddle both sectors are multi-regional companies.   
 
In total, 195 interviews were conducted across the 16 companies.  They include interviews with 
headquarter managers for human resources and operations, with regional managers, with store 
managers and with a sample of frontline workers—part-time and full-time, front end and sales 
floor workers as well as those in specialized departments (e.g. bakery, deli, copying, and home 
entertainment).  Because interviews were conducted outside of busiest store hours, they tend to 
include fewer very junior, very short hour workers and more of those who are regularly 
scheduled, even in part-time.  In most, but not all, cases, the visited store was located near 
headquarters and was considered the “flagship” store.  We attempted to factor this fact into our 
questions, often probing managers and workers with experience in more than one store (as well 
as in other companies) for contrasts and comparisons.  We also asked for summary statistics on a 
variety of personnel indicators, and received them from about half of the participating 
companies.  All interviews were coded with qualitative software using a coding scheme prepared 
by the research team.   
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Findings 
Overview 
 
Respondents at all companies pointed to the competitive threat from Wal-Mart and other 
aggressively growing discounters.  Electronics retailers identified online sellers as another threat.  
As noted, companies are primarily reacting in two ways.  First, all companies seek to cut costs.  
The price cutting pressure some have experienced is extreme and, in some settings, has surged 
suddenly.  Second, retailers seek to distinguish their market offering by providing better service 
(and in some cases providing new services), and/or higher quality or more varied goods.  In some 
cases the second strategy involves extending the boundaries of retailing, for example greatly 
expanding prepared food offerings to compete with the restaurant/food service industry or 
vertically integrating into the design and installation of home entertainment systems, thereby 
significantly altering the mix of offerings away from “off the shelf”  hard goods and toward 
services. 
 
The two companies that sell both food and electronic goods diverged from this generalization.  
Bargain Mart (all company names are pseudonyms), a warehouse store chain, competes based on 
strong logistical efficiencies and constant fine-tuning of the product mix based on what is selling.  
Village Voice, a convenience store chain based in small rural and semi-rural communities too 
small to support a big box, profits from a geographic oligopoly.  Both cases are interesting, but 
we largely omit them from our discussion because they are less typical. 
 
When discussing service strategies, it is critical to note that the concept of “service” is multi-
dimensional.  As used by retailers, it encompasses: 
• Attention and pleasant interaction 
• Product knowledge and problem-solving 
• Provision of additional services 
• Convenience (meaning the ability to get in and out of the store quickly) 
Although most media attention tends to focus on the first two (see, for example, Martin 2009), 
we find that in terms of competitive strategy, the third and fourth are more important—in part 
because, regardless of avowed goals, most companies appear to fall in a fairly narrow band on 
the first and second elements of service. 
 
Though both food and electronics stores pursue both service and quality/variety, there is a major 
difference in emphasis.  Consumer electronics retailers follow a strategy we call “service-
driven.”  Here key selling points are the availability of services that a Wal-Mart or Dell doesn’t 
offer, ranging from home installation, to convenient computer repair, to photocopying.  Services 
may be packaged with high-end, specialized electronic components, but the strategy stresses the 
services themselves.  As an increasing slice of consumer electronics goods themselves become 
commodities, such services are one area where competition is not based on cost, and margins are 
higher.  This approach typically involves segmenting customers to target services to higher-end 
customers within a store’s client population. 
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Food retailers, on the other hand, more often adopt a “quality-driven” approach.  Here the main 
differentiator is higher quality goods, often including interesting variety.  Attractive, fresh, and 
varied meat, fish, cheese, produce, wine, baked goods, prepared food, and deli offerings are 
typical.  This model incorporates some service, in the form of counter assistance (deli, fish) or 
product knowledge (wine, cheese), but the principal selling point is quality.  Though standard 
grocery items have become commodities, fresh and attractive produce or meats are not 
universally available, and by offering them grocers seek to defend or carve out a higher income 
market niche that allows higher margins.  Interestingly, the way quality and variety are achieved 
is partly through changes in purchasing but also through greater labor input (hand placement in 
display, attention, preparation). Unlike the electronics cases, strong customer segmentation 
within a store is impractical, though large chains do use multiple banners (store names and 
formats) to attract distinct segments of customers: for example, Safeway’s Pavilions stores target 
more affluent shoppers. 
 
We use the distinction between service-driven and quality-driven strategies as an organizing 
principle to guide us through some indicative cases.  In what follows, we explore these two 
product strategies in more depth, and then look at their relation with labor strategies and job 
quality outcomes.  
 
Different contexts in Consumer Electronics and Food Retail 
 
Importantly, differences in histories and patterns of labor use should be noted at the outset.  They  
play a part in our account because they shape the range of options that retailers in each sector 
consider for implementation.  In short, consumer electronics retail, particularly the big box 
variety,  is a recent development.  Partly as a result, it has had 7-day operation and heavy 
reliance on part-time employment from the start.  Historically, the emphasis on knowledge of 
technological  product features has steered the industry toward hiring and promoting men.  The 
sector hires store management readily from outside and even from other parts of retail.    Food 
retail on the other hand exemplifies “old” retail.  It has the longest history, and has experienced 
significant change from exclusive reliance on internal promotion to some outside hiring as well 
as the move from full-time employment to nearly half part-time employment, particularly for 
front-line workers.  The bulk of employment has been in cashiers and clerks who have tended to 
be women with a few “craft-like” occupations such as meat cutters that have tended to be male 
dominated.  Also, both sectors rely on part-time arrangements for entry level positions with the 
first promotion often entailing the move from part-time to full-time work. 
 
Different histories, products sold, and gendered patterns of employment and promotion seem to 
underlie significant differences in average pay.   Consumer electronics retail offers much higher 
average hourly pay for frontline workers than retail as a whole ($16 in 2007, compared to $11.80 
for all of retail) ,while grocery stores pay less ($10.80) (Carre and Tilly 2008)    
 
Finally, an important job characteristic throughout retail, with few exceptional companies, is that 
hourly pay for part-timers  is  lower than for full-timers (33% lower, for retail as a whole) (Carre 
and Tilly 2008).  Part-time work is ubiquitous in frontline retail jobs. 
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Service-driven competitive strategy  
 
What we call service-driven retailers compete with large-scale discounters by selling services.  
This strategy is primarily typical of electronics retailers, though a number of retail food 
managers commented that “Whoever figures out home delivery is going to own the market.”  
Consumer electronics products are sufficiently complex that there is a market for services related 
to them (setup, repair).  Broad-line mass-marketers like Wal-Mart and Target have not yet 
occupied that space, and online sellers cannot easily provide such services.  This is especially 
true of more customized services—essentially quasi-luxury “goods” that can nonetheless be 
purveyed by mass market chains that are willing to adopt a different strategy than simply 
charging the lowest price.  Electronics retailers’ goal of expanding services is thus “an escape 
from low-margin hell” (Business Week 2006; see also Discount Store News 1998).  As a 
Technology Source store manager remarked, “We have to be more service oriented. Margins on 
TVs and computers and actual boxes, product, is always dropping and if we don’t get that 
service piece nailed, then we won’t survive.”   
 
One basic “service” to be sold is service agreements and extended warranties, which every 
electronics retailer in our sample strove to push as do virtually all other such retailers.  
Commenting on the financial results of two industry leaders, an industry observer noted that 
extended warranties were estimated to account for “more than a third of Best Buy’s operating 
profit and all of Circuit City’s” in 2005 (Berner 2005).  Wal-Mart’s 2005 entry into the extended 
warranty business, with warranties priced at one-half to one-third the level charged by its 
competitors, cranked up competitive pressure in this once-comfortable corner of electronics sales 
(marked by 50-60% margins on service agreements, much higher than the 4% margins on sales 
of goods) (Berner 2005, Digital Home 2008).  But nearly two years after Wal-Mart forayed into 
warranties, Warranty Week reported that the large electronics retailers were still charging rates 
roughly three times that of Wal-Mart (Goldstein 2007), indicating that this offering is still a 
significant revenue source. 
 
But beyond this baseline offering, we saw two distinct service-driven strategies in different 
segments of the market:  in broad-line consumer electronics chains on one hand, and in office 
supply chains on the other.  In broad-line consumer electronics, national chain Electronix 
exemplifies the shift to selling services per se.  Electronix sells a wide range of electronics 
consumer products, having evolved over time from a warehouse format to a more hands-on 
seller.  The chain offers two lines of service beyond extended warranties.  On the one hand, for 
run-of-the-mill customers, the chain offers auto installation and computer repair plus, 
increasingly, home installation (again, Wal-Mart is attempting to move into the installation and 
repair business in a pilot joint venture with Dell [Birchall and Allison 2008], so specialized 
electronics retailers may not retain this beachhead in the long run).  On the other end, for high-
end customers, Elextronix devised a store-within-a-store formula in which salespeople work with 
customers to design and install elaborate home entertainment systems that can price out at tens of 
thousands  (and occasionally a couple of hundred of thousands) of dollars.   Importantly, except 
for auto installation, all of these services involve interaction with the customer in his or her 
home, which escalates the service-intensity of the tasks. 
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Electronix seeks to expand both lines.  “They wanted to get anywhere from 5-7% of the store 
sales from services, because the margin is available,” a Store Service Manager commented.  The 
company emphasizes “hand-tos,” in which a salesperson or cashier helping a customer buy a 
small item calls attention to higher end offerings including the store-within-a-store, ideally 
introducing the customer directly to a high-end salesperson.   
 
Electronix added key services in this portfolio by acquiring independent companies that 
specialized in the services.  They also in-sourced core elements of home installation, which was 
formerly subcontracted.  Service functions are functionally and spatially segregated from routine 
selling, sited in distinctive locations within the store, above all in the store-within-a-store.  A 
supervisor explained, 
You’ve got a separate divided area, a more intimate area. You know, lights are turned 
down low. Everything is not so bright. The music is turned down, so it’s a little bit more 
of an atmosphere change. Then there is obviously a different level of professionalism that 
you get with [store-within-a-store] staff than you would get with the Electronix staff. 
 
A supervisor saw competitive advantage resting in the connection between the quality of home 
installation of complex systems and follow-up services, on one hand, and customer loyalty on the 
other: 
Home theater systems .. can run into small snags. The wife comes home and hits the 
wrong button on the remote control and nothing turns on again. It’s those kind of things. 
…You’re gonna be the first person they’re gonna call and they’re gonna want it fixed 
instantly. Those are the times right there when you either have them come back because 
you’ve taken care of their situation right and they’re gonna come back and buy things 
from you or they’re gonna send their neighbors, their buddies, their friends to you. Or 
that’s when the name can be dragged through the mud.   
 
The value proposition does include product quality as well as service. The store-within-a-store 
also stocks specialized, high-end equipment.  The supervisor continued, “We’ve got a very, very 
vast product assortment, things that you would find rivaling your higher places like your 
Ultimate Electronics, and your kind of mom-and-pop shops, things that [Electronix] really never 
had their foot in the door before [the store-within-a-store] came along.”  In so doing, Electronix 
and a few other national chains aim to replicate services offered, until recently, only by 
specialized, high end, audio/video equipment stores. In short, they aim to displace these stores 
and, in many regions, have succeeded in doing so. 
 
Other soup-to-nuts consumer electronics retailers in our sample follow similar strategies, though 
none in our sample are as successful as Electronix.  The specifics vary.  The strategy at 
Technology Source, another national chain offering a wide range of electronic goods, has the 
same elements as that of Electronix, except that Tech Source has attempted to build services 
within its own organization rather than acquiring specialized companies—a less successful 
approach at the time we studied these companies.    High Fidelity, a smaller, higher end regional 
chain, runs entirely like Electronix’s store-within-a-store.  Almost every salesperson is trained to 
assist with system design and installation.  Hi Fi also sells off-the-shelf merchandise, but such 
sales are secondary to core activities.  Hi Fi was struggling in the market when we studied them.  
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In recent months, Wal-Mart has begun a shift “up market” (stocking higher end electronics 
products) to draw customers away from specialized electronics stores (Bustillo 2009). But its 
efforts, so far, do not include the relatively intensive service contents that specialized stores have 
devised. 
 
A second service-driven model is more characteristic of office supply chains that include office-
related electronic equipment as part of a range of office supply offerings.  In this case, margins 
are higher on non-electronics office supplies, but retailers include electronic equipment as part of 
a full range of offerings.  It is precisely the scope of available products that is the service 
offering.   The Office, a nationwide chain, markets itself as a convenient seller of office supplies 
where customers can find everything they need.  The Office has recently added copying, 
imaging, and printing services, which provides quite a high margin.  A regional manager at The 
Office noted that photocopying “was a commodity at one time. We’re getting to the point now 
where it has a real magical ability to drive sales because people are so happy with the results 
that we could deliver for them, that they’re very pleased to pay a premium for that.”  In addition, 
salespeople throughout Office stores seek to identify small business customers in order to 
speedily meet their needs.  As a regional manager (TO9) at The Office put it, “We know that 
those users are very loyal. We know that they aren’t as dependent on looking only at price to 
make their purchase decisions.”  He added that the decision to make small businesses a priority 
target “shifted everything, from our focus on customer service to our merchandise mix to our 
marketing mix, primarily at the small business user.”  This translates into a focus on 
convenience: 
If you think about what a small business user goes into an Office store for, they don’t 
want to have a lot of time here. They want to get into the store. They want it to be in 
stock. They want someone to help them and be friendly and helpful and help them 
immediately. They want to be able to find the product in the store and they want to check 
out quickly. 
The other office-focused chain in our sample, Office Express, follows the same strategy, 
including recent addition of copy centers. 
 
What it takes to succeed in service-driven retailing 
 
To what extent could niche operators capture and hold the market for high-end services in 
consumer electronics retailing?  Our cases do not fully answer this question, but both case 
evidence and observation of the market suggests that operators exclusively focused on high-end 
segments are losing ground.  Electronix’s purchase of strong competitors in entertainment 
(digital audio/video) systems design points to economies of scale (perhaps in marketing and 
purchasing) as well as scope (offering a full range of products and services).  High Fidelity 
represents the continuation of the traditional “hi-fi shop” that caters to more sophisticated 
customers with sales clerks who are all system designers, but this model’s market is being 
usurped by larger, broader-line chains like Electronix; hence Hi Fi’s market difficulties.  In fact, 
part of the success of chains over these more specialized stores is that all have moved toward 
“modular” system designs with a few base designs with a range of options, rather than designing 
systems “from scratch.”  This formula is less reliant on technical knowledge and dulls the market 
edge of specialized firms and their staff. 
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On the office side, Kinkos represents the most successful example of stand-alone duplicating 
services, but the acquisition by FedEx (and conversion of Kinkos copy shops to FedEx Kinkos, 
now FedEx Office, copy-and-delivery outlets) and the addition of a limited range of office 
supplies for sale, at least in the newer and larger stores, again points to economies of scope. 
 
Stipulating that more broadly integrated retailers are better situated to sell services, making 
service-driven strategies successful still depends on a number of factors.  Employees must 
successfully identify high-value customers, a process that relies on sales workforce skills and the 
agility of the customer data management system (though this is less of an issue when customers 
self-select, as in computer repair or copying services).  When sales staff is segmented (as at 
Electronix), lower end sales clerks in the main part of the store must effectively make the 
handoff to the higher end staff.  Stores must be spatially segregated or customer densities low 
enough that other customers will not feel envious or entitled to high-end services.  Compensation 
must be structured in a way that rewards high ticket sales but does not simply absorb much of  
the value captured from high-value customers. 
 
Workforce implications 
 
Service-driven strategies in consumer electronics have weighty implications for job quality.  
Conversely, as the list of requirements above suggests, success of a service-driven strategy leans 
heavily on staff capacity, configuration, and to some degree on the form of compensation. 
 
Most fundamentally, shifting to selling more services implies changes in job content.  An 
Entertainment Sales Specialist at Electronix spoke about this change in words worth quoting at 
length: 
The biggest thing is it used to be for the people that were here before…was you’d have a 
guy walking around with a number sheet in front of him all day and was gonna say you 
need to push X amount of boxes or X amount of dollar amount out the door and then 
we’ll hit revenue and we’ll all be happy and we’ll give a big cheer and everybody will go 
home. Now it’s not… Obviously, we’re here and we’re not a nonprofit organization by 
any means so we’re trying to make some money when this is all said and done, but we’re 
trying to do it by making sure we’re doing what’s right for the customer. So you know, if 
it’s somebody in home theater, it’s taking the two hours out of your time to make sure the 
customer gets the right things, leaves the store with everything they need and making this 
the one stop solution for them so that when they get home it works exactly the way it 
worked here in the store and it does what we told them it can do.  
We heard remarkably similar narratives of change at Tech Source and Hi Fi, even though the 
latter has long been known for selling primarily higher-ticket complex entertainment systems and 
equipment. 
 
The implications for both job content and compensation are somewhat different in broad-line 
electronics and office supply stores.  For broad-line consumer electronics like Electronix or 
Technology Source, one powerful impact is workforce segmentation, separating a store’s staff 
into distinct tiers.  The criterion for entry into the upper tier is advanced technical skills 
(computer repair, auto installation) or advanced sales skills plus in some cases managerial skills.  
Although sales jobs involving systems design and coordination involve some technical skill as 
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well, managers at several chains told us they were shifting away from recruiting and training for 
advanced technical skill, and instead emphasizing sales ability.  An Electronix store manager 
commented, “Quite frankly, I’ve been a very successful salesperson with a very small knowledge 
base around electronics. Ultimately you’re selling yourself and not the product.”  In the case of 
home installation, an important added overlay is the “general contractor” skills involved in 
coordinating the work of installers.  These management skills are mix of ability to sequence tasks 
and coordinate services and communication/”people” skills.  These are required to smooth out 
the scheduling of components deliveries, cost estimates for alterations (wall modification for 
wiring and installation), meshing of physical alteration and electronic work, and proper 
communication throughout with the customer. 
 
The consequences of segmentation include large differences in job quality, somewhat tempered 
with variable pay as an important motivational tool for all workers even low-level ones.  At 
Electronix, for example, pay differences illustrate the gap in job quality: part-time sales staff in 
the main part of the store earn from minimum wage up to $10/hour, whereas in the store-within-
a-store part-timers can go up to $16, computer repair techs can earn $19 or more, and supervisors 
earn up to $26..  It is important to point out the broader context for these wage figures: 
nonsupervisory workers in electronics retailing averaged $18.31 in 2007 (when we completed 
our fieldwork), 43% more than the average retail worker and 62% more than the average grocery 
employee (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009).   
 
To further motivate lower level employees to deliver “hand-tos,” Electronix and Tech Source 
mobilize peppy frontline management including “fun” games and activities, all built around 
team-building and internalization of sales goals and techniques.  Both companies also implement 
a small variable bonus —taking account of department and store-wide performance—plus 
“instant bonuses” in the form of gift certificates distributed by managers to recognize 
outstanding service. Variable pay partly serves to mitigate  the significant pressure on even 
lower-level employees to qualify (profile) customers and send appropriate ones to the store-
within-a-store.  As one elite sales manager noted: 
The [store-within-a-store] pros’ other job is to, what we do is go out fishing. What that 
means is they’re gonna go out looking for the customers that would have any interest to 
shop in that area of the store and hopefully catch those customers and bring them back to 
that room. Also, when they’re out fishing, what they’re gonna spend their time doing is 
coaching and training employees on how do we qualify customers to get them into that 
room.   
 
High Fidelity only includes the upper segment of services; in this case the line of segmentation 
separates the entire chain—and other specialist companies like it— from large chains in the 
sector.  Essentially almost the entire staff including most managers consists of high-level 
salespeople paid on commission. 
 
In the alternative service-driven model of office equipment stores, where spatial and customer 
base segmentation is limited, segmentation in pay is significant, but not as pronounced.  
Reviewing senior employee wages at The Office stores, we find a part-time cashier at $9.60, an 
office equipment salesperson at $13.63, and a copy center supervisor at $15.75.  The Office uses 
other carrots and sticks to motivate employees: significant opportunities for salary growth with 
 
 
11 
longevity (the three employees noted above started at $7-8/hour), a small bonus based on 
department and company performance, and intense reliance on customer surveys and “mystery 
shoppers” to monitor employee behavior.  These incentives are linked, since “the weighting of 
the customer service index[in the bonus] is growing.” 
 
The abandonment of commissions tied to sales of goods appears to be an important correlate, and 
possible predictor, of success in the service-driven strategy.  As margins on consumer electronics 
goods fell, commissions made less and less economic sense, adding to unit labor costs while 
contributing little in terms of margin on added sales.  Among broad-line electronics retailers, 
Electronix dropped commissions early, Tech Source eliminated them later, and Hi Fi was still 
using them when we spoke to them (though it had cut the commission rate as margins shrank).  
This maps exactly onto the degree of market success of the three companies.   Somehow, timely 
redesign of the compensation system—cuts in effective pay for some while spreading incentives 
to all workers—may have enabled some companies to best address the tension between cost 
cutting and worker focus on service provision. 
 
Commissions were never present at the two office supply sellers in our sample, but both at one 
time used “spiffs,” special cash incentives for selling high-margin items such as extended 
warranties.  Office Express still uses spiffs to induce employees to sell extended warranties, 
whereas The Office has shifted to a bonus system and dropped spiffs because they motivate “bad 
behavior”—for instance, inducing an employee to discount the sales price of an item in order to 
sell the service plan.  Again, The Office’s no-spiff policy correlates with better performance. 
 
In addition to finding new forms of workforce motivation, the other ubiquitous tension that 
constantly threatens the service-driven strategy is that all of these companies are trying to cut 
costs, narrowing the price differences with Wal-Mart and online sellers, at the same time as they 
increase the service component of their offerings.  Results of cost cutting include thin staffing 
which, when combined with greater expectations from front-line workers to have diffuse 
attention for customer needs, threaten the service-driven model.  At an Office Express store, a 
middle manager complained of lack of time: 
“We’re real short handed especially during those peak times.  It makes it real hard to 
help out every single customer that we get in the store, juggling between all of them. 
Obviously you want to give the customer a great shopping experience. It’s a little hard 
when you’re running back and forth between customers.”  (OE7) 
 
Cost cutting, where it results fewer resources for training, can undermine the service-driven 
strategy.  At The Office, an office equipment salesman (TO7) noted that “A lot of the cross 
training is what hit the floor when they cut the payroll,” and faulted the precipitous decline in 
training for reducing workers’ ability to help out across jobs.  In turn, this lack of polyvalence in 
front line workers may undermine key elements of the service-driven strategy which are to 
qualify potential higher-end customers and having a sales workforce with well rounded skills 
combining some technical knowledge with coordination and people skills. 
 
Importantly, turnover which is expected to be high in settings with many part-time, often young, 
workers, seems to have increased in some companies due to increased job requirements and 
broader job contents.  “There’s a lot more requirements in the jobs these days,” said a sales 
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supervisor at Technology Source.  “So, therefore, there is a lot more things to mess up on.  
Therefore, there’s lot more ways to have turnover.” (TS20)  As expected, turnover makes it 
difficult to instill customer service orientation and those additional skills needed to “qualify” 
potential customers for higher margin service purchases.  Furthermore, turnover and a general 
concern about workload in full-time supervisory positions seem to deplete the pipeline of those 
ready to move up to management roles—a trend shared with some other parts of retail, 
particularly food retail. 
 
Quality-driven competitive strategy 
 
Primarily adopted by food retailers as discussed above, the quality-driven strategy relies 
primarily on extensive product differentiation rather than service provision.  Because customers 
shop in all parts of the store, from basic dry goods to on-site prepared meals, the tension between 
cutting labor costs and providing higher end services is not easily isolated in food stores.  Unlike 
in consumer electronics stores, it is not possible to “tier” levels of service provision in the store 
and segment the customer population, either by spatial segregation of activities or by active 
customer profiling.  Except for the meat, fish, and deli-takeout counters, there are scarce options 
to isolate time-intensive and knowledge-intensive, costlier, service options from the rest of the 
store which is low service and requires little product knowledge.3
 
  Therefore, food retailers avail 
themselves of the extensive product differentiation, in both variety and quality, afforded by retail 
food.  Grocers implement this differentiation in incremental ways that entail greater labor input 
(time and attention) and test the boundaries of what is conventionally understood to be a 
supermarket.  The goal of this differentiation is to draw and retain customers with higher 
purchasing power but also to get everyone who shops in the store to consider buying luxury 
and/or higher-labor-content products that support higher margins. 
The quality-driven strategy entails broadening significantly the range of product offerings in the 
store, increasing the variety of conventional food products (e.g. multiple kinds of canned 
vegetable) but also increasing the share of fresh produce, meats, fish, baked goods, and cheese in 
total offerings.  This entails more worker effort for stocking and also demands worker attention 
and knowledge about freshness and quality. The quality-driven strategy also entails offering 
gourmet items such as wine or exotic items.  Importantly, it includes more labor intensive 
offerings such as ready meals, meals prepared on order, and ready-to-cook meals that compete in 
a crowded field with the restaurant industry, gourmet stores, and food prepared at home.  These 
items are higher ticket items with prospects for greater margins.  For such items, counter service 
is often involved (though not always, as in the case of salad bars), but grocers’ attempt to 
differentiate themselves is primarily based on food quality and presentation.  This differentiation 
is partly a result of purchasing decisions but mostly the result of work effort in selection, 
preparation, presentation, and stock rotation (aimed at freshness). 
 
Consider two successful examples of the quality-driven strategy, Homestyle and The Market, 
both regional chains that have managed to continue growing.  Homestyle defines its competitive 
advantage as “quality and service” (HS 7).  Its market niche is college-educated customers with 
                                                          
3 Though we did not study such cases, it is conceivable for a company to run “convenience”, “discount” and “full-service” store 
formats to tap into distinct customer segments. 
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higher income and a taste for food or wine.  It is thus able to offer higher quality products, and 
indeed is “number one with variety and merchandising” in its market and “the largest purveyor 
of wine” in its home state, according to an executive (HS 1).  A Homestyle produce manager 
commented that in the early 1980s, when he first started at Homestyle, “all the stores were just 
pretty standard box stores, standard grocery stores. Since then, Homestyle has gone to a lot 
bigger, nicer look”; the two stores we visited presented their food (particularly produce and 
prepared foods) very attractively.  Homestyle defines restaurants as a competitor.  In the words 
of the company’s VP of HR, 
We don’t want our folks to eat out!  Our clients are the ones that like to go to the nice 
restaurants as well. So when the economy gets tight, people will tend not to eat out as 
much and therefore we need to be able to offer that different solution…. So we have chef-
prepared meals that are restaurant quality. A lot of folks instead of eating out will have 
that at home. Pick up a bottle of wine on your way out. (HS 1) 
Homestyle competes head-to-head with Wal-Mart.  Where Wal-Mart has entered a Homestyle 
market area, stores have seen limited sales losses of about 20 percent (HS 1).  A store manager 
commented that when Wal-Mart opened next door he saw an impact on cleaning and paper 
products, but “they put their groceries in the store, a few aisles of it, and I really didn’t see an 
impact there” (HS 11).  Despite losses to Wal-Mart, Homestyle has been able to continue 
growing total sales through expansion.  Consistent with defining a niche distinct from that of 
Wal-Mart, Homestyle continues to practice hi-lo pricing (based on weekly sales on selected 
items) rather than the everyday low prices approach championed by Wal-Mart. 
 
The Market, another regional chain using a hi-lo pricing strategy, also now aims at higher end 
customers.  According to a regional manager, a 36-year veteran, due to The Market’s “quest to 
be leading edge,… Goods and services has grown and become more complex, much more 
specialized work being done: …custom cut meats, fresh seafood, scratch bakeries….  People 
want something that’s new and different and unique that their neighbor necessarily doesn’t 
have.” (TM 4)  A store manager repeatedly referred to The Market’s perishable departments as 
one key to retaining customers, adding that although he has not had to face Wal-Mart, from what 
he’s heard other The Market stores have prevailed despite Wal-Mart’s arrival because of superior 
perishables and service.  (TM  15)  The Market has experienced steady, moderate growth while 
other chains in the region have contracted. 
 
Though we have emphasized quality and variety, service is definitely part of the formula.  In 
fact, interviewees at both Homestyle and The Market would disagree with our characterization of 
their strategy as quality-driven: Homestyle’s VP of HR (HS1) and the one store manager we 
interviewed at The Market (TM15) pointed to service as their main competitive advantage.  
Among the dimensions of service, these and other interviewees focused on attention to customers 
and keeping wait times short.  We stand by our “quality-driven” label, since based on their 
description and our direct observations of service levels, their service does not distinguish them 
from most other non-warehouse supermarkets in the sample (though it does distinguish them 
from Wal-Mart).  Indeed, a district manager at regional grocer P.A. Smith (which we do not 
profile in this paper) commented, 
“Companies will say we’re really customer driven, we’re customer oriented, customer is 
number one, all of that, but I think what they deliver to the consumer is far less than that 
and I think they tolerate far less than that and I don’t think P.A. Smith is an exception 
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with that…. To go back to those times [15 or 20 years ago], we had customer driven 
programs, mystery shoppers and all those type of things, that said okay, how good are 
you with the consumer? I don’t think that’s a whole lot different now. The ability to 
execute might be different because any time you go from managing 75 to 100 people to 
managing 250 people, you know, that’s gonna be very different.”  
But Homestyle and The Market respondents are correct in the sense that without an adequate 
level of service, quality cannot win and hold onto customers. In other words, there is a required 
threshold of customer interaction and service to uphold (and ideally upgrade).  The two 
companies have taken a number of steps toward this end, for example in the case of Homestyle 
strengthening training and initiating bonuses for frontline workers, as we will describe below.   
 
Service in the stronger sense of providing information and advice based on product knowledge 
could potentially complement a quality strategy more directly, helping to develop customer 
tastes.  The VP of HR at The Market gave an example:  
We have to really teach people about the products because I believe that if people 
understand the products, they will naturally talk to the customers, because people want to 
share their knowledge. We did a knowledge-based training in our meat department, and 
it was the most successful customer service training we did. We taught every single meat 
associate how to prepare the meat and how to cook it and what you don’t do. We think 
that was one of the most successful training programs for us but what we were teaching 
them is get excited about the products. (TM6) 
However, this approach to service is the exception rather than the rule.  In fact, the context of the 
HR VP’s anecdote was a complaint that this remained an isolated experiment, and that most 
service training consists of “just telling people to smile.” 
 
Though Homestyle and The Market have been most successful in implementing a quality-driven 
strategy, every supermarket-format food retailer in our sample is pursuing some version of this 
strategy.   Among food retailers, only chains with a warehouse or convenience store format were 
not emphasizing quality to the same extent. 
 
 
What it takes to succeed in a quality-driven strategy  
 
We will argue in the following section that the quality-driven strategy has an impact on 
employment practices, and that employment practices in turn can sustain or undermine a quality-
driven approach.  Before moving on to that, however, we want to look at elements outside the 
labor dimension that structure the opportunities for competing on quality.  Three such things 
appear to help companies succeed in a quality-driven strategy: starting out with an emphasis on 
quality, being privately held, and operating in a more sheltered market. 
 
First, it is an advantage to start at the “higher end” of product offering and customer service 
when competitive pressure ratchets up, either through direct competition from a new, low price, 
store or through generalized pressure to lower prices.  It appears easier to retain a position as a 
higher end food retailer —to retain an image as well as customers—than it is to transform from a 
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mid-level retailer to a higher end one, in conditions of price cutting competition.4
 
  Homestyle 
and The Market represent the former starting point: both of them had built up a reputation for 
quality long before the most recent wave of competitive pressure, though to be sure each has 
taken added steps to cultivate that reputation in the current conjuncture.  At Homestyle, for 
example, a store manager (HS11) declared, “We’ve always stood for cleanliness and trying to 
have a niche out there in the market to try and be a little bit better and also better products than 
anybody else. That’s always been what we stood on.”   
 
Still, it is possible to make the transition up market.  Food Chief, a “cog” in a multi-regional 
holding company, is a unionized regional grocery chain that has responded to low-price 
competition from Wal-Mart and others by attempting to move up-market to middle and upper-
income consumers, emphasizing meat and produce quality, a variety of new fresh and prepared 
food offerings, cleanliness, and service, as well as its identity as the “hometown market.”  
(Pricing is still “hi-lo.”)  According to a Regional HR Director at Food Chief (FC1), “15, 20 
years ago, [our appeal] was price…. For many years, our tag line was ‘low price leader’. To be 
perfectly honest, we had to take that back now that we’re doing with more Wal-Marts.”  But 
now, she added, “we’re known in [Food Chief’s home region] for our fresh produce. People 
come to Food Chief for our produce. We just launched a big meat campaign where we have a 
certain line of beef that you can only get at Food Chief and it’s very high quality. You know, 
freshness, cleanliness, and price.”   A store manager (FC10) instead emphasized variety: “If I 
were to say there’s a Wal-Mart across the street and why would they come to Food Chief versus 
a Wal-Mart or a Target Super Center, I would probably say the variety, the assortment, the 
number of SKUs.” 
 
Second, being privately-held appears to buy food retailers some leeway to implement a quality-
driven strategy.  It has enabled some retailers, over the years, to make investments with medium- 
to longer-term horizons, and to use reserves to address recent competitive pressures.  Homestyle 
is privately held (with strong though decreasing family presence in management).  The Market is 
privately held and just over 50 percent employee-owned.  Management at The Market credits 
being privately held and majority employee-owned with being able to make investments with 
mid- to long-term returns.   
 
Being privately-held and historically higher end buy leeway to implement a quality-driven 
strategy but are insufficient by themselves.  Freshland (FL) also is a privately-held, unionized, 
regional grocery chain with banners ranging from warehouse to upscale, with a strong (but 
lessening) family presence in management.  The company defines its competitive advantage as 
quality (produce and meats), cleanliness, and customer service and targets customers with above 
average income. But cost-cutting to narrow the gap with Wal-Mart has undermined a labor 
strategy built around loyalty, longevity, and commitment, as we will examine further below.  
 
                                                          
4 Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter (1996) note that a firm’s history shapes the tools at its disposal to adapt to rapid change in 
competitive conditions.  “Mature” firms with fairly stable internal labor markets turn into “defenders” of their market.  They may 
experience difficulty moving to a different market segment.  The distinction is useful even for retail where “stability” in the 
workforce is far lower than in other sectors. 
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Thirdly, operating in a sheltered regional market allows some companies to take a more 
deliberate approach to implementing a quality-driven strategy.  Operating with enough stores in 
areas with as yet little or no direct competition enables companies to anticipate competitive 
changes and learn from the experiences of some of their urban stores that are experiencing 
competitive pressure as well from other retailers.  The extreme case is Village Voice, which 
operates convenience-store-sized units in rural and semi-rural areas, filling the gaps between 
Wal-Marts, as it were.   
 
Another market sheltering issue: in regions with more laissez-faire land use policy, new retailers 
can easily enter, generating more price- and convenience-based competition and making it harder 
for the quality-driven model to succeed.  Consider the example of Value Fresh, another regional 
grocer, that is struggling with price-cutting competition.  Sales have been flat and market share 
has fallen over the past 10 years on its two main store formats: mid-range supermarket (fresh 
produce, deli, bakery, and meat)—the bulk of stores—and an “every day price cut”/discount 
formula with narrower range of offerings targeting mid- and low-income shoppers.5
 
 In the mid-
range supermarket formula, the company aims to differentiate itself from the competition (both 
Kroger and Wal-Mart) with higher levels of service and better quality fresh produce, meat, 
bakery, and deli departments.  The land-use regulatory environment in Value Fresh’s area is 
relaxed and it is easy to locate a new supermarket (a point also made by another chain, 
Marketland, with an overlapping market area).  All 20 independent grocery stores in the urban 
area we visited were driven out of business over the past two decades by a mix of direct 
competition from Wal-Mart and other discounters but also by expansion of larger, multi-
regional, chains seeking new markets to remedy their losses to discounters in other regions. 
Job quality and the quality-driven strategy 
 
Job quality outcomes, in terms of both current job quality and recent changes, look better at the 
grocers successfully implementing a quality-driven strategy.  Clearly, there are two possible 
directions of causality here.  On the one hand, businesses that are struggling financially because 
their quality strategy is not succeeding can ill afford “high road” employment practices—a 
significant outcome, but not a surprising one.  On the other hand, and more interestingly, HR and 
compensation policies ill-suited to quality-driven competition may undermine that strategy, in 
either the short run or the long run.  The quality-driven strategy relies upon supervisor focus and 
worker effort to maintain product display and freshness and worker orientation to the customer 
experience.  Indeed, quality and variety require extra work.  A Food Chief store manager with 
twenty years at the company (FC3)noted that new offerings such as “the sushi bar, the Asian 
bar, hot wings, salad bar, things we didn’t have in the past” have required added staffing.  
Moreover, “the quality piece” also escalates work demands: “You’re not stacking bananas six 
high. You’ve got a two-hand rule and that’s it. You got to fill them five times during the day. That 
was a major culture shift for Food Chief. Major, major, major.”  Increasing variety also requires 
added effort, he added: 
We used to be positioned where there might be two kinds of green beans on the shelf. 
Each kind was three cases wide, three cases deep, four cases high. What’s happened over 
time is that variety, variety, variety. Now maybe there’s ten kinds of green beans but all 
                                                          
5 A third formula is a higher end supermarket encompassing a few stores. 
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of them are three cans wide going to the back, so they’re not case-packed anymore. 
They’re hand-stacked. So we’ve taken some of our efficiencies out of the system. 
Food retailers that face steep price cutting competition or that choose to implement deep labor 
cost cuts run into workforce motivation “walls” that store managers find difficult to overcome 
with the few tools at their disposals to act as incentives to work harder and serve better.  The two 
directions of causality may join in a vicious circle.  As we describe job characteristics and how 
they are changing, we are looking particularly for evidence of the second causal connection and 
of possible cumulative causation. 
 
 
Success, but with tensions: Homestyle and The Market 
 
Homestyle and The Market have been relatively successful in building up employment strategies 
that support a quality-driven approach.  Homestyle has bumped up initial training (a newly hired 
cashier reported eight hours of computer-based training, whereas a cashier hired three years 
earlier received 30-60 minutes of training before starting on a cash register), and has invested in 
hiring and training managers who can more successfully motivate frontline workers.  Like almost 
all chains in our sample, Homestyle has shifted toward hiring more managers from outside the 
company and even from other branches of retail, but a district manager emphasized, “Towels are 
a whole lot different than bananas….  Perishable is such a big part of what we do at Homestyle, 
and do well, that people have to understand that.” (HS13) 
 
Pay at Homestyle is near the top in our sample; pay rates are 5 to 10 percent above union scale, 
despite the absence of a union.  Only 40% of Homestyle’s workforce is part-time, by far the 
lowest rate among conventional grocery stores in our sample, and among the lowest in the 
industry.  Even so, benefits are no more generous than industry standards.  The Market, on the 
other hand, has devised means to improve part-time jobs, the bulk of which are held by frontline 
workers in direct contact with customers.  It provides time and a half for those PT workers 
working more than 35 hours per week—whereas throughout the industry part-time is used to flex 
hours up to 40 hours and not beyond so as to avoid incurring FLSA mandated overtime pay.  
Furthermore The Market has historically provided some health benefits for part-timers.  This 
outstanding practice is under pressure however. The company moved the eligibility from six 
months to one year because, in the words of management, “all of our competition is moving 
further and further out, even our [union] competitors.”  (TM6)  The Market’s 60% rate of part-
time employment is closer to the grocery mainstream than Homestyle, but still below Food 
Chief, Freshland, and Value Fresh. 
 
 
Successful quality-driven food retailers have sought multiple ways to motivate the frontline 
workforce and, most notably, gravitate toward incentive pay.  Homestyle has implemented a 
workforce-wide profit-sharing bonus system. In an industry where historically only managers 
received incentive pay, this approach appears equitable and feeds workforce commitment.  
Incentive pay is targeted to customer service.  “There is probably no better catalyst to motivate 
your people than standing in front of them and talking about, ‘You help us achieve our goals, I’m 
going to put money in your pocket,’” a Homestyle district manager (HS13) said. “A part-time kid 
can understand that.”  Homestyle tries to reward good customer service in smaller ways as well.  
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A store manager (HS15) told us,  “If an associate gets a customer compliment, for example, or 
something good where a customer says something or calls into corporate with something good 
about them, I give them two free movie passes.”  Similarly, The Market provides cash rewards at 
managers’ discretion.   
 
Homestyle has among the lowest turnover rates in the industry. It brought its turnover down from 
a range of 90 to 100 percent years ago to 50 percent (2006).6
 
  The rate had risen somewhat from 
three years prior as labor markets tightened. This was no great cause for concern, however.  
Management wants a degree of what it terms “healthy turnover” to renew the workforce (and 
keep average pay and benefit levels low) and would prefer not to see the separation rate dip 
below 40 percent.  The Market declined to provide overall turnover statistics, but department 
managers report aiming to schedule their full-timers regularly so they won’t turn over when they 
find jobs that accommodate the hours they want. (TM8) 
Despite all of this, delivering the quality-driven strategy at the store level builds in significant 
tensions.  At Homestyle, there has been pressure on staff schedules and total job demands for 
managers, supervisors, and front-line workers because staffing gets “a little tighter every year” 
according to a front end manager.  A full-time customer service associate has to be available to 
be scheduled to work anytime (HS11). A customer service manager remarked, “I think we just do 
a lot—one person can do a lot in one day.” (HS12)  A produce clerk at the same store had a less 
positive spin: “If they weren't gonna give any more hours, and they're not going to, they'd have 
to come up with a better system of being able to get it all done without killing people.” (HS5)   
 
At the Market, as at Homestyle, pressure is significant.  In the words of interviewees, including 
regional managers, there are “incredible” demands on managers; they are expected to be “hands 
on” and work long hours.  To implement goals of quality, product displays and the overall look 
of the store, have become quite important. Everyone at headquarters and in the store say that they 
want the store to look attractive—indeed, the visited store looks attractive.  This emphasis 
generates significant workload: one manager said “People [consumers] do not realize what it 
takes to make the store look like this.” 
 
 From tensions to conflicts: Value Fresh, Freshland, Food Chief 
 
In other retailers, these tensions and others have escalated to the point where they are threatening 
the quality-driven strategy.  Value Fresh avows a commitment to high quality and service.  
However, at the store level, cost cutting has translated into a squeeze on monthly labor budgets, 
that is, the ability to have labor hours in the stores. In turn, these cost cutting pressures adversely 
impact training time and resources as well as the ability to grant pay raises.  These in turn 
threaten to thwart store managers’ ability to improve service and maintain quality because of 
workforce issues. The company has experienced competition in the recruitment of entry level 
workers. It offers wages pegged at the same level as Target or Wal-Mart, close to the minimum 
wage, making retention difficult.7
                                                          
6 Turnover is, however, four times higher for short-hour part-timers, those working under 20 weekly hours. 
  Changes affecting mid-level management and supervisors 
have played a part.  With more manager recruitment from the outside (with college degrees) 
7 Turnover, at 60%, is high by historic standards for the company. 
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those in place see less options for promotion and, one surmises, fewer reasons to adhere to 
service goals. 
 
Freshland and Food Chief, the two unionized companies in the study, have also cut down 
staffing, increasing workloads and “doing more with less” in the words of a Freshland manager.  
(FL3).  A Freshland produce clerk spelled out the implications and intimated disaffection:  “The 
amount of work [has] gone up quite dramatically. But it's just basically they cut labor in order to 
either make more money or obviously there's competition so they have to trim the fat somewhere 
in terms of labor. If there's the same amount of work that needs to be done, then obviously we 
have to take up the slack…. There's just less of us, so it's kind of suck up and do more work.” 
(FL7) 
 
But the change that has precipitated the most dramatic consequences is the implementation of 
two-tier pay scales with a lower wage cap for newly hired clerks.  At Freshland, management 
perceived the two-tier structure as inevitable.  “With competition like Wal-Mart,” said a district 
HR manager at Freshland, “it’s difficult to pay our employees a higher wage while maintaining 
competitiveness.”   But this change limiting upward mobility clashes with a company strategy 
based on high commitment and “fierce loyalty.”  Employee turnover has climbed, and 
management sees a decline in service levels.  At the time we visited, Freshland had just launched 
a new “engagement” initiative, but the initiative consisted mainly of cheerleading plus coaching 
based on mystery shoppers.  A store manager commented: 
I think that they didn’t know to what extent this last contract would just make it for a 
deluge [of turnover] because that was never part of our culture and now they’ve seen it 
and traditionally we’re running behind the curve. They’re hoping this engagement piece, 
having people more aware and conscious or feeling part of, will help that. (FL8) 
 
At Food Chief, likewise, a newly adopted lower wage cap for entry-level workers raised 
concerns about worker commitment. “Only the people at the top of the scale got…progressive 
increases. People in the lower ranks were frozen. That’s a huge, huge, huge change from what 
they’re used to. They’re used to seeing a 3, 4% increase every year of the contract.” (FC1)  
Partly to address workforce motivation concerns, Food Chief recently launched employee 
rewards programs (small cash bonuses at manager discretion) tied to customer service.  But 
implementing a radical culture shift while having fewer incentives to offer workers seems to 
constitute a daunting managerial and supervisory challenge.  Furthermore, at Food Chief, the 
implementation of the quality-driven strategy coupled with cost cuts has meant the reallocation 
of resources toward fresh products and “enhanced” stores (with more offerings) away from other 
stores “to try to get to the bottom line.” (FC2) in the words of a regional manager.  Overall, 
therefore, the likely results in product quality and customer service are unclear at best. 
 
In addition to commitment difficulties, a second potentially problematic consequence of higher 
turnover, scantier staffing, and increased pressures on managers is the thinning of the internal 
pipeline for supervisors, store managers and regional managers.  On the one hand, fewer 
employees aspire to move up within the company, as a Freshland cashier explained in the case of 
the head cashier job: 
There's not a whole lot of people that want those [head clerk jobs]. The big downside for 
that is they only make a quarter more an hour but now you have a lot more responsibility. 
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You're now responsible for running that front end. You're responsible for closing the 
store and making sure things are being taken care of and customers are taken care of.  
(FL10) 
(Note that the slim 25-cent raise is a consequence of the pay cap for new hires.)  On the other 
hand, managers who are lucky enough to have effective full-timers are reluctant to let go of 
them, impeding the flow to higher level jobs.  At Value Fresh, a human resource official stated: 
Something that I noticed over the last five years that has changed significantly is the 
ability to career path individuals into a department manager training program from 
within the company. My theory as to why that has happened has to do with the 
relationship of the hours adjustments over the last X period of years and because the 
hours get down so tight where you have so few key people, the go-to gal or the go-to guy 
that I know I can ask them to do anything and it will be done, the managers don’t want to 
give them up. (VF2). 
The HR official summed up Value Fresh’s situation by wryly commenting, “Everybody is vying 
for that food dollar and you have to find a way to make it work.  Wages are the easiest thing to 
control.  It gets to a point where you can control yourself right out of a business.” 
 
Summary Conclusions 
 
We have explored the different mixes of product and labor strategies in force in US retail and 
how they differ in consumer electronics and food retailers.  Retailers have devised such mixes in 
response to market “shock” caused by invasion by big-box store formats often combined with 
discounting. The main drivers of their responses have been:  first, cutting costs, primarily labor 
costs; and, second, increasing the service (thus labor) contents of products (quality and variety in 
food), the offering of service-based products (in electronics), as well as enhancing the overall 
customer experience of service. 
 
We have highlighted two strategies —service-driven in consumer electronics and quality-driven 
in food—that show promise as means to acquire customers and retain existing ones.  These 
strategies require that there be a fit between product and labor strategy.  We, like others, see this 
fit as key to succeeding.   
 
The paper has focused on examples ranging from successful adaptation to severe challenges, and 
examined what settings make relative success possible as well as its implications for job quality.  
By successful adaptation, we mean that companies have retained adequate market share or even 
increased it, and show internal signs of capacity to sustain the strategies they have adopted.  
Success opens the possibility for, though does not guarantee, better job quality.  We certainly 
found cases of such adaptation; some but not all of these companies provide better jobs. 
 
By severe challenges, we mean two things.   First, we refer to companies that continue to 
experience a loss of market share.  We observed companies in both consumer electronics and 
food retail in this situation.  But we also refer to companies that encounter challenges emanating 
from their labor strategy which lead us to doubt the sustainability of their approach over the 
medium term, given the setting in which they operate, their corporate history, and management 
decisions.   
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Even success entails tension between the two main drivers of adaptation in retail: cutting labor 
costs and implementing a quality- or service-driven strategy.  We have highlighted conditions in 
which these tensions can be addressed, and conditions in which they become unmanageable and 
workforce difficulties undermine business performance.  The process of change plays out 
differently in consumer electronics and food retail.  
 
In consumer electronics retail, market concentration driven by newer, big-box format stores has 
been underway over the past 20 years.8
 
 The service-driven strategy has been implemented with 
more ease by large companies able to have economies of scope as well as scale.  (Scope may 
mean hosting a wide-range of options for combinations of electronic products and services or 
combining electronic and office products.)   It has been most difficult for companies with a 
narrower market focus to adapt to the combined effects of price wars in “off the shelf” goods 
(TVs and PCs in particular) and the declining need for technical knowledge on the main sales 
floor itself driven by digital technology-based audio/video products.  What smaller companies 
offer is neither cheap enough to compete with discounters nor broad enough to draw a large and 
varied customer base.  We did hear about labor strategy as a stumbling block to successful 
service provision—as cost-cutting trims staffing or training budgets, and added job demands feed 
turnover rather than promotion.  But as determinants of success or failure, these labor-grounded 
tensions appear secondary to company scale and scope. 
In retail food, on the other hand, the impact of labor strategy on retailers’ ability to execute a 
quality-driven strategy appears more decisive.  As we have detailed, some food retailers’ steep 
cuts in labor undermine staff’s ability to maintain a level of customer interaction sufficient to 
retain customers they might draw into the store with greater product variety and quality.  For 
some, the tightness of “labor budgets” in stores and the prospect of their further reduction even 
threaten the business “core” of the quality-driven strategy; workers find it difficult to maintain 
displays, to replenish in timely fashion, and keep the store straightened out.  In effect, they 
struggle with upholding the quality and variety goals per se.  In these places, we see little room 
for further improvement in product quality and customer service—both of which seem necessary 
to draw customers and retain their willingness to pay more than rock-bottom prices; supervisors 
and managers already juggle competing demands and report not being able to retain a front-line 
workforce that will put in the extra effort of attention and care required.  In these environments, 
respondents from full-timer to manager opined they had reached the limit of long hours (for 
salaried workers) and multi-tasking; they cannot see how to do their job and absorb further labor 
cuts.9
 
 
Whether this deeply rooted tension in food retail reaches the point of a critical conflict depends 
on a combination of internal and external factors.  It appears that internal factors such as 
management know-how play a role.  Equally important, and somewhat related, is company 
history, both its market position at the time it experiences a sharp rise in competition and its long 
standing practices regarding workforce management10
                                                          
8 The current crisis has further precipitated it, making it difficult for companies other than largest chains (and warehouse-style 
discounters or online retailers) to survive.  
 that either enable adaptation or require 
9 According to industry observers, the current economic crisis is creating this type of conflict in many retailers.  Training and 
incentives have been cut and staff on the sales floor has thinned (Smith 2009). 
10 See also Cappelli and Crocker-Hefter 1996. 
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such drastic alteration that change is ill-received by the workforce.  Private ownership increases 
the room for maneuver in this sector, as it does in others.  External factors, institutional factors in 
particular, come into play. Regional differences in land use regulation, the degree of urbanization 
and mall development, play a role in how rapidly competition increases and, therefore, how 
much lead time food retailers have to adapt.  Thus, in this US-based account, institutional factors 
at the level of the region play quite an interesting role in food retailers’ options.11
 
 
What might be prospects for job quality in these two sectors of retail?  We found that some 
companies do provide better quality jobs with a greater share of full-time positions and even with 
some benefits for part-time positions.  While the highest paying consumer electronics sales jobs 
are mostly gone with the removal of commission pay in many companies, the sector remains one 
of the highest paying subsectors. The practice of “tiering” customers, services, and products 
adopted by large consumer electronics retailers results in segmentation of the workforce, with a 
small segment of higher paid workers —“designers” and coordinators of home entertainment 
systems, as well as technicians—and a large sales workforce on the floor with more limited 
prospects for advancement.  Training, always a scarce commodity in retail, has been ratcheted up 
but remains insufficient to propel a front-line worker, without a college or technical degree, into 
the higher pay segment.   
 
Even companies that appear to have successfully adapted have not been spared tensions between 
product and labor strategies, however.  These have consequences for job quality.  In most 
companies, heavy workloads are an issue; they are heaviest for full-time workers, supervisors 
and managers.  Simple full-time workers may be required to be available for work 24-7 to fill 
staffing gaps in the mostly part-time workforce.  Dissatisfaction with the workload and schedules 
(combined with relatively flat pay gradients) manifests itself with a thinning “bench” of 
management candidates in some companies.   
 
In summary, electronics and food retailers have adopted related but distinct product strategies in 
response to price competition: service-driven in electronics, quality-driven in food.  These 
product strategies do interact with labor strategies, generating tensions as attempts to cut 
spending on labor clash with service and quality objectives that demand labor resources, skills, 
and continuity.  But while such tensions are omnipresent, it is only in the grocery sector that they 
appear to be playing a central role in blocking competitive success for some companies. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 We have explored elsewhere with European colleagues how national institutional factors play a role in retailers strategies and 
job quality in frontline retail jobs (see Carré, Tilly, vanKlaveren, and Voss-Dahm, forthcoming 2009.) 
 
 
23 
References 
 
Andersson, Fredrik, Harry J. Holzer and Julia Lane. 2005.  Moving up or Moving On:  Who 
Advances in the Low-Wage Labor Market?  New York: The Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Appelbaum, Eileen., Berg, Peter, Frost, Ann, and Preuss, Gill “The effects of work restructuring 
on low-wage, low-skilled workers in U.S. hospitals.” In E. Appelbaum, A. Bernhardt, and R. J. 
Murnane (Eds.), Low-wage America: How employers are reshaping opportunity in the 
workplace, New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003, pp. 77-117. 
 
Appelbaum, Eileen, Thomas Bailey, Peter Berg, and Arne Kalleberg. 2000.  Manufacturing 
Advantage.  Ithaca, NY:  ILR Press, an imprint of Cornell University Press. 
 
Appelbaum, Eileen, Annette Bernhardt, and Richard J. Murnane  (Eds.). 2003 a. Low-wage 
America: How employers are reshaping opportunity in the workplace, New York, NY: Russell 
Sage Foundation, pp. 77-117. 
 
Appelbaum, Eileen, Annette Bernhardt, and Richard J. Murnane  (Eds.). 2003b. “Low wage 
America: an overview” in Low-wage America: How employers are reshaping opportunity in the 
workplace, New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 1-29. 
 
Bailey, Thomas and Annette Bernhardt.  1997.  “In search of the high-road in a low-wage 
industry.”  Politics and Society.  25 (2): 179-201. 
 
Batt, Rosemary.  2000.  “Strategic Fragmentation in Front Line Services:    Matching Customers, 
Employees, and Human Resource Systems.  International Journal of Human Resources 
Management.   June.  11 (3): 540-61. 
 
Berner, Robert.  2005.  “Watch out, Best Buy and Circuit City: Wal-Mart is attacking their 
business model by offering lower-cost warranties.”  Business Week, November 21, p.46. 
 
Bernhardt, Annette, Heather Boushey, Laura Dresser, and Chris Tilly.  2008.  The Gloves Off 
Economy: Workplace Standards at the Bottom of America’s Labor Market..  Ithaca, NY:  Cornell 
University  Press-LERA. 
 
Birchall, Jonathan and Kevin Allison.  2008.  “Dell and Wal-Mart test tech services.”  Financial 
Times, July 16, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a106c352-537e-11dd-8dd2-
000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1 . Consulted July 16, 2008. 
 
Business Week.  2006.  “Best Buy: How to break out of commodity hell.”  March 27, p.76. 
 
Bustillo, Miguel.  2009.  “Wal-Mart Steps Up Its Game In Electronics Aisle.” 2009.  Wall Street 
Journal.  May 18, p. B1. 
 
Cappelli, Peter, and Anne Crocker-Hefter.  1996.  “Distinctive Human Resources are Firms’ 
Core Competencies.”  Organizational Dynamics, pp. 7-22. 
 
 
24 
 
Cappelli, Peter, Laurie Bassi, Harry Katz, David Knoke, Paul Osterman, and Michael Useem. 
1997. Change at Work, New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Card, David and Alan B. Krueger.  1995.  Myth and Measurement: The New Economics of the 
Minimum Wage.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Carré, Francoise and Chris Tilly. 2008.  “America’s Biggest Low-wage Industry:  Continuity and 
Change in Retail Jobs.”  Submitted to the Ford Foundation.  Center for Social Policy and 
Institute for Labor and Employment Relations. 
 
Carré, Françoise, Chris Tilly, Maarten vanKlaveren, and Dorothea Voss-Dahm.  Forthcoming 
2009.  “Retail jobs in comparative perspective.”  In Jérôme Gautié and John Schmitt, eds., 
European Low Wage Work.  New York: Russell Sage Foundation.  
 
Davis, Elizabeth, Matthew Freedman, Julia Lane, Brian McCall, Nicole Nestoriak, Timothy 
Park. Forthcoming. “Product market competition and human resource practices:  An analysis of 
the retail food sector.” Industrial Relations. 
 
Digitalhome.  2008.  “Wal-Mart Canada to offer extended warranties for electronics.”  March 17.  
http://www.digitalhome.ca/content/view/2380/206/ .  Consulted May 1, 2009. 
 
Discount Store News.  1998.  “Service.”  37:21 (Nov. 9), p.25.   
 
Goldin, Claudia and Lawrence Katz.  2008.  The Race Between Education and Technology.  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Goldstein, Marianne.  2007.  “Are extended warranties worth the money?”  The Early Show, 
August 11.  
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/08/10/earlyshow/contributors/raymartin/main3156565.sht
ml?source=RSS&attr=_3156565 .  Consulted May 1, 2009. 
   
Grimshaw, Damian and Jill Rubery.  1998. “Integrating the Internal and External Labour 
Markets.”  Cambridge Journal of Economics.  28: 199-220. 
 
Jones, D. C., Kato, T., and Weinberg, A. Managerial discretion, business strategy, and the 
quality of jobs: Evidence from medium-sized manufacturing establishments in central New 
York. In Low-wage America: How employers are reshaping opportunity in the workplace. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2003, pp. 479-526. 
 
Krueger, Alan B. 1993.  “Have computers changed the wage structure?  Evidence from micro 
data,”  Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 108 no. 1 (February) 33-60. 
 
Lichtenstein, Nelson, ed.  2006.  Wal-Mart: The Face of Twenty-First Century Capitalism.  New 
York: New Press. 
 
 
 
25 
Levy, Frank, Richard Murnane and David Autor.  2004.  The New Division of Labor: How 
Computers Are Creating the Next Job Market.  New York and Princeton: Russell Sage 
Foundation and Princeton University Press. 
 
Martin, Timothy W. 2009.  “May I help you?  Publix Super Markets is finding success where 
rivals aren’t.  Its main weapon: Customer service.”  Wall Street Journal, April 23, R4. 
 
Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushey. 2003. The State of Working America 
2002/2003. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Moss, Philip, Hal Salzman, and Chris Tilly.  2008  “Under construction:  The continuing 
evolution of job structures in call centers.   Industrial Relations. April.  V. 47, no.2:  173-99. 
 
Smith, Darrell. 2009.  “Strapped retailers wrestle with customer service.”  The Sacramento Bee.  
March 5.  
 
Smith, Vicki.  2001.  Crossing the Great Divide: Worker Risk and Opportunity in the New 
Economy.  Ithaca, NY: ILR Press/Cornell University Press. 
 
Smith, Vicki.  1990.  Managing in the Corporate Interest: Control and Resistance in an 
American Bank. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Tilly, Chris. 1996.  Half a Job:  Philadelphia:  Temple University Press. 
 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics.  2009a.  Current Employment Statistics database.    
http://stats.bls.gov/ces/#data .  Consulted 5/4/09. 
 
US Bureau of Labor Statistics.  1996.  “BLS reports on employer-provided training.”  Economic 
News Release.  http://www.bls.gov/news.release/sept1.toc.htm .  Released July 9, 1996; 
consulted 5/4/09.   
 
Vidal, Matt with David Kusnet.  2009.  Organizing Prosperity: Union Effects on Job Quality, 
Community Betterment, and Industry Standards.  Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute. 
 
 
 
 
